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Abstract
Robots are increasingly used to carry out critical missions in
extreme environments that are hazardous for humans. This re-
quires a high degree of operational autonomy under uncertain
conditions, and poses new challenges for assuring the robot’s
safety and reliability. In this paper, we develop a frame-
work for probabilistic model checking on a layered Markov
model to verify the safety and reliability requirements of such
robots, both at pre-mission stage and during runtime. Two
novel estimators based on conservative Bayesian inference
and imprecise probability model with sets of priors are intro-
duced to learn the unknown transition parameters from oper-
ational data. We demonstrate our approach using data from a
real-world deployment of unmanned underwater vehicles in
extreme environments.
1 Introduction
Extreme environments, as a term used by UK EPSRC1 to
denote environments that are remote and hazardous for hu-
mans, are one of the most promising application areas in
which robots can be deployed to carry out a task, such as in-
specting oil and gas equipment, maintaining offshore wind
turbines or monitoring nuclear reactors. Interaction with hu-
man operators is often infeasible in such remote environ-
ments, so autonomy becomes a key requirement, meaning
robots have to learn to adapt when performing tasks in
changing and unexpected circumstances (Lane et al. 2016).
However, unforeseen behaviour of a robot could result ei-
ther in failure of its own mission or even undermine the in-
tegrity of the asset being inspected or repaired – with po-
tentially catastrophic consequences, e.g. accidental punc-
ture of subsea pipelines. The robots themselves are high-
value assets, whose loss or damage may be very costly.
Moreover, there are increasing demands on regulating au-
tonomous robots to build public trust in their use. Yet,
the analysis of safety and reliability for autonomous robots
poses a significant challenge due to the inevitable uncertain-
ties in a mission. Potential sources of risk range from failures
of sensors or hardware, to built-in algorithms making poor
choices in a stochastic environment. Key industrial foresight
reviews (Lane et al. 2016) outline a vision of self-certifying
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robotic systems, i.e. systems that continuously monitor their
current and predicted performance and assess it within a
predefined certification framework (Robu, Flynn, and Lane
2018; Fisher et al. 2018).
Probabilistic model checking (PMC) (Kwiatkowska, Nor-
man, and Parker 2018) has been successfully used to anal-
yse quantitative properties of systems across a variety of
application domains, including robotic systems (Luckcuck
et al. 2018). This involves the construction of a probabilis-
tic model, commonly using Discrete Time Markov Chain
(DTMC), Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) and
Markov Decision Process (MDP) when considering non-
deterministic actions, that formally represents the behaviour
of a system over time. The properties of interest are nor-
mally specified in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) or Proba-
bilistic Computational Tree Logic (PCTL), then systematic
exploration and analysis is performed to check if a claimed
property holds.
One inherent problem for most (if not all) formal verifi-
cation techniques is that the verification assumes the formal
model (e.g. DTMC) accurately reflects the actual behaviour
of the real-world system (Calinescu et al. 2016). Compar-
ing to conventional systems - for which we might argue the
formal model is fairly accurate – it becomes a tougher is-
sue for systems in changing, unexpected environments and
with autonomous features. To handle the issue, the run-
time verification idea was proposed (Epifani et al. 2009;
Calinescu et al. 2012) by keeping the formal model alive
and continuously updated when seeing new data at runtime.
In this paper, we propose a tailored PMC framework for
verifying safety-critical robots working in extreme environ-
ments. Firstly, we formalise how the robot works as a lay-
ered and parametric DTMC (transition probabilities are un-
known parameters), then feed two Bayesian estimators for
different types of parameters with operational data. For each
mission, safety and reliability properties are verified at both:
Pre-mission, based on the best knowledge from previous
similar missions, lab-simulations and experts, which pro-
vides assurance before the robot undertaking a mission.
Runtime (i.e. during a running mission), using a DTMC
updated in real time. This allows the robot to take protection
actions (e.g. restart with new control policies or abort the
current mission) whenever a property of interest is being vi-
olated, which offers an additional control layer, independent
of the robot’s front-end planning engine. This follows the
“defence in depth” design paradigm for safety critical sys-
tems, by providing an extra and diverse layer of protection.
To achieve these, we identify two types of transition pa-
rameters and introduce two novel Bayesian estimators as:
A. Catastrophic failure related parameters, which repre-
sent the probability of seeing a catastrophic failure when the
robot is in an unsafe state. In practice, we cannot observe
sufficient data of catastrophic failures to provide good esti-
mations, since even if we do observe any, we normally will
redesign/update the robot making the failure data obsolete.
So effectively, for these model parameters, we will only col-
lect failure-free data that lead to very optimistic estimations
by existing Bayesian estimators. To avoid underestimating
the chances of catastrophic failure, our claim is inference in
such settings has to be carried out in a conservative way.
The conservative Bayesian inference (CBI) method (Bishop
et al. 2011; Strigini and Povyakalo 2013; Zhao et al. 2015;
2017) was developed for safety-critical software to answer
the question what can be claimed rigorously about the relia-
bility when seeing failure-free runs. To our knowledge, our
work is the first to develop a CBI estimator for catastrophic
failure parameters in robotics.
B. Non-catastrophic failure related parameters, which
represent the transitions among normal, unsafe and non-
catastrophic states, thus sufficient data can be collected as
more missions are conducted. Bayesian methods yielding
point estimates, e.g. (Epifani et al. 2009; Calinescu et al.
2014), are affected by unquantified estimation errors which
will be propagated and compounded in the verification in
ways that are unknown but likely to be significant, as high-
lighted in (Calinescu et al. 2016). Here we introduce an im-
precise probability model with sets of priors (Walter and Au-
gustin 2009; Walter, Aslett, and Coolen 2017) to (i) get up-
per and lower bounds on the posterior estimates whose range
measures the estimation errors; (ii) allow modelling imper-
fect prior knowledge/data from experts/lab-simulations in a
flexible way; and (iii) detect prior-data conflict (Evans and
Moshonov 2006) when observe surprising data in a mission
to provide protection from the robot’s epistemic limits.
We illustrate our new method with an example of an un-
manned underwater vehicle (UUV) in the context of a valve
turning scenario from the PANDORA2 project which cre-
ated UUVs that keep going under extreme uncertainty.
Next, we present the necessary background concepts. Two
new Bayesian estimators are described in Section 3; Section
4 describes the new framework with an illustrative example.
Section 5 summarises the related work. Contributions, limi-
tations and future work are concluded in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 DTMC and PCTL
Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) is a widely-used
model for formalising stochastic systems. From the verifi-
cation point of view, DTMC can serve as a secondary pro-
tection model given an optimal policy (specifying a proce-
dure for autonomous action selection). For instance, if the
2http://persistentautonomy.com/?p=1436
primary planner synthesises an optimal policy via MDP and
reinforcement learning (Pathak, Pulina, and Tacchella 2018;
Pathak et al. 2013), then given the optimal policy, we obtain
an induced DTMC (Puterman 2014) which can be revised to
emphasise the safety and reliability aspects by, e.g. adding
more transitions to states representing hazards.
Definition 1. A DTMC is a tuple (S, s1,P, L), where:
• S is a (finite) set of states; and s1 ∈ S is an initial state;
• P : S×S → [0, 1] is a probabilistic transition matrix such
that
∑
s′∈S P(s, s
′) = 1 for all s ∈ S;
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function assigning to each
state a set of atomic propositions from a set AP .
We use the notation pij = P(si, sj), and i, j are integers
in [1, k] by assuming there are k states in total. Given an
optimal probabilistic3 policy, the transition probability of the
induced DTMC is defined as the total probability of:
pij =
∑
a∈A
pia(si) · Pr(sj | si, a) (1)
where pia(si) is the probability of executing action a in state
si according to policy pi and Pr(sj |si, a) is the probabil-
ity that sj is the next state when action a is executed in
state si. In this paper, we assume the optimal policy pi, i.e.
pia(si), is given by a separate planner and Pr(sj |si, a) will
be Bayesian updated via operational data.
The safety and reliability properties to be checked can be
specified in Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL).
Definition 2. AP is a set of atomic propositions and ap ∈
AP, p ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ N and ./∈ {<,≤, >,≥}. The syntax of
PCTL is defined by state formulae Φ and path formulae Ψ.
Φ ::= true | ap | Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | P./p(Ψ)
Ψ ::= XΦ | ΦU≤tΦ
where the temporal operatorX is called Next and U is called
Until. State formulae Φ is evaluated to be either true or false
in each state. Satisfaction relations for a state s are defined:
s |= true , s |= ap iff ap ∈ L(s)
s |= ¬Φ iff s 6|= Φ
s |= Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iff s |= Φ1 and s |= Φ2
s |= P./p(Ψ) iff Pr(s |= Ψ) ./ p
Pr(s |= Ψ) ./ p is the probability of the set of paths start-
ing in s and satisfying Ψ. Given a path ψ, if denote its i-th
state as ψ[i] and ψ[0] is the initial state. Then the satisfaction
relation for a path formula for a path ψ is defined as:
ψ |= XΦ iff ψ[1] |= Φ
ψ |= Φ1U≤tΦ2 iff ∃0 ≤ j ≤ t
(ψ[j] |= Φ2 ∧ (∀0 ≤ k < j ψ[k] |= Φ1))
It is worth mentioning that both DTMC and PCTL can
be augmented with rewards/costs, cf. (Filieri and Tambur-
relli 2013), which can be used to model, e.g. the energy/time
3Deterministic policy is a special case with probability 1.
consumption of the robot in a mission. Our approach is also
compatible for those properties which we omit in this paper.
By formalising the robot and its required properties in
DTMC and PCTL respectively, the verification focus shifts
to the checking of reachability in a DTMC. In other words,
PCTL expresses the constraints that must be satisfied con-
cerning the probability, starting from the initial state, of
reaching some states being labelled as, e.g. unsafe, failure
or success. We use the tool PRISM (Kwiatkowska, Norman,
and Parker 2011) which employs symbolic model checking
algorithm to calculate the actual probability that a path for-
mulae is satisfied (by extending the PCTL definition with
P=?(Ψ)), then comparing with a required bound if given.
2.2 Parametric model checking
PMC based on DTMC normally assumes the transition prob-
abilities are known as constants which can be estimated from
existing data and experts at design-time, or through system
runtime monitoring. However, this traditional technique may
not be suitable for runtime analysis in terms of the exces-
sive time and power consumption, especially for robots. The
idea of parametric model checking (ParaMC), proposed by
(Daws 2005), provides an efficient solution (Filieri, Ghezzi,
and Tamburrelli 2011). As shown by (Jansen et al. 2014),
modern tools can solve parametric DTMCs with thousands
of states and transitions using reasonable computing re-
sources, beyond the required capability of our methods here.
ParaMC can analyse DTMC whose transition probabili-
ties are specified as functions over a set of parameters, e.g.
Equation (1). The result is then given as a closed-form ra-
tional function of the parameters which brings two advan-
tages: (i) The verification can be divided into two steps. The
computationally expensive symbolic analysis can be done
at pre-mission stage when time and power constraints are
not strong; then, during the mission, only substitutions are
needed to replace the parameters in the closed-form expres-
sion with actual values learnt at runtime; (ii) Monotonic-
ity analysis of the parameters can be easily done via the
closed-form expression. Since, instead of point estimates,
our new Bayesian estimator provides bounds for the parame-
ters, thus monotonicity analysis is necessary to obtain mean-
ingful bounds for the verification results.
3 Estimates for DTMC transition parameters
3.1 A fundamental Bayesian estimator
In a DTMC, given a current state i, the transition to a next
state follows a categorical distribution. Due to the Markov
property, i.e. the choice of a next state only depends on
the current one, the categorical distributions for each state
are independent. Hence, as we observe repeated transitions
from the state i, the repeated categorical process follows a
multinomial distribution. Now the problem is reduced to the
localised learning of k independent multinomial distribu-
tion, where k is the number of states in the DTMC. From
a Bayesian inference perspective, the posterior estimation
requires a statistical model (the likelihood function) and a
prior distribution. Note a complete description of Bayesian
inference is beyond the scope of this paper.
For the i-th row of P, if we observe the data of transition
number from state i to j as nij , and ni =
∑k
j=1 nij is the
total number of outgoing transitions from state i, then the
likelihood function is (by omitting the combinatorial factor
which will be cancelled in the Bayesian formula):
Pr(data | pi1, ..., pik) =
k∏
j=1
p
nij
ij (2)
The method in (Epifani et al. 2009) uses a Dirichlet dis-
tribution as priors for a given i-th row of P:
(pi1, ..., pik) ∼ Dir(n(0)i p(0)i1 , ..., n(0)i p(0)ik ) (3)
where n(0)i p
(0)
i1 , ..., n
(0)
i p
(0)
ik are the canonical parameters
of the Dirichlet. p(0)ij is the prior expectation for the transition
probability pij , and larger n
(0)
i leads to more concentrated
probability measure around p(0)ij . Thus, n
(0)
i are quantifying
the strength of beliefs in the prior p(0)ij , or a “pseudo-count”
which can be interpreted as the size of an imaginary sample
that gives the prior estimation (Walter and Augustin 2009).
Then applying the Bayes rule, and thanks to both the con-
jugacy (with the multinomial likelihood function) and the
canonical form, the posterior with updated parameters are:
n
(ni)
i = n
(0)
i + ni (4)
p
(ni)
ij =
n
(0)
i
n
(0)
i + ni
· p(0)ij +
ni
n
(0)
i + ni
· nij
ni
(5)
Note, the upper index (0) is used to identify the prior pa-
rameters, in contrast, the (ni) denotes the posterior param-
eters after observing ni outgoing transitions from the state
i. As Equation (5) shows, after seeing nij out of ni as data,
the posterior p(ni)ij is a weighted sum of two terms: the prior
estimate of p(0)ij and the nij/ni which is the frequency of the
relevant transition in the data. The weights are proportional
to the n(0)i (the “pseudo-count” of prior simple size) and ni
(the “actual-count” of data sample size). Smaller n(0)i rep-
resents lower confidence in the priors and the runtime data
will dominate the posteriors. When n(0)i ' 0, (5) reduces to
the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Epifani et al. 2009).
3.2 A Bayesian estimator using sets of priors
There are at least two practical issues with the method in
Section 3.1: (i) how to justify a particular choice of prior
model parameters, i.e. n(0)i and p
(0)
ij . In other words, whether
one can truly express the subjective and imprecise prior
knowledge with the exactness that a particular prior distri-
bution requires; and (ii) how to measure the error of single
point estimation which will be propagated and compounded
in the later model checking in ways that are unknown but
likely to be significant, as pointed in (Calinescu et al. 2016).
To address these two concerns, we utilise an imprecise
probability model using sets of priors (Walter and Augustin
2009; Walter, Aslett, and Coolen 2017) to model more vague
prior knowledge by eliciting bounds of the prior parameters,
and also resulting bounds for the posteriors whose range
measures the estimation errors. Also importantly, it is sen-
sitive to detect the prior-data conflict, i.e. conflicts between
prior assumptions and observed data (Evans and Moshonov
2006), which is useful to alter dangerous situations and will
be discussed later.
To be exact, instead of a single value, we elicit an interval
for each prior parameters in (3) and denote these as:
n
(0)
i ∈
[
ni
(0), ni
(0)
]
, p
(0)
ij ∈
[
pij
(0), pij
(0)
]
Then as proved in (Walter and Augustin 2009), the lower
and upper bounds for the posteriors of interest p(ni)ij are:
pij
(ni) =

ni
(0)pij
(0)+nij
ni(0)+ni
if nijni ≥ pij(0)
ni
(0)pij
(0)+nij
ni(0)+ni
if nijni < pij
(0)
(6)
pij
(ni) =

ni
(0)pij
(0)+nij
ni(0)+ni
if nijni ≤ pij(0)
ni
(0)pij
(0)+nij
ni(0)+ni
if nijni > pij
(0)
(7)
When nijni /∈
[
pij
(0), pij
(0)
]
, i.e. the prior-data conflict
is at hand, the posterior interval
[
pij
(ni), pij
(ni)
]
becomes
wider, meaning we are even less certain about the posterior
estimation comparing to the priors. This is a new property
comparing to other imprecise probability models in which
the range of the posterior interval will always, regardless
of the prior-data conflict, decrease (i.e. converge to the ob-
served data) as the sample size increases.
3.3 Conservative Bayesian inference
Catastrophic failures are modelled in our new framework
by imposing transitions from unsafe states to catastrophic
failures of different modes, e.g. the parameter x in Fig.1
as an instance. The “true unknown” values of these transi-
tion parameters may lie in very small orders of magnitude,
say 10−5 → 10−9, as a result of rigorous development pro-
cess and safety-critical designs. This poses a great challenge
for the estimation of such smaller failure rates in terms of
that infeasible amount of statistical testing or operational
time is required to observe sufficient failure data (Littlewood
and Strigini 1993). More practically, even if we did observe
any catastrophic failures, we normally will redesign/update
the robots, which makes the failure data obsolete. So ef-
fectively, we will only collect catastrophic-failure-free data.
Such “good news” would increase our confidence that the
robot has a smaller chance to cause catastrophic failures,
hence our claim is such inference has to be done in a con-
servative way. The conservative Bayesian inference (CBI)
method (Bishop et al. 2011; Strigini and Povyakalo 2013;
Zhao et al. 2015; 2017) was developed for safety-critical
software to answer what can be claimed rigorously about the
reliability when seeing failure-free runs. Here we introduce
CBI as our Bayesian estimator for the catastrophic failure
related parameters. Note, we only present the more practi-
cal case of seeing no catastrophic failures in this paper. The
essential CBI can be extended to model very scarce failures.
In a given unsafe state i, as discussed above, the outgoing
transitions follow a multinomial distribution, so marginally,
the number of transitions to the catastrophic failure state,
say nij , is a binomial one, nij ∼ Bin(ni, x) where x is the
transition probability and ni is the total number of outgo-
ing transitions from state i. Then the likelihood function for
the data of no catastrophic failure observed, i.e. nij = 0,
is: Pr(data|x) = (1 − x)ni . So if we have a prior distribu-
tion for x, say f(x), by Bayes rule we know the posterior
expectation is:
E(x | data) =
∫ 1
0
x(1− x)nif(x)dx∫ 1
0
(1− x)nif(x)dx
(8)
Conventionally, starting from Equation (8), we assign a
parametric family for f(x), e.g. a conjugate Beta in this case,
or like the Dirichlet-Multinomial case in Section 3.1. How-
ever, the use of conjugacy is based on the assumption that
the practical situations we are dealing with have large quan-
tities of failure data, in which the dominant contribution to
posterior belief via Bayes Theorem comes from the likeli-
hood function, i.e. situations in which “the data can speak for
themselves”. We do not have this luxury for safety-critical
systems with very limited or no failure data, so any use of a
particular parametric family for f(x) is questionable.
Instead of assuming a complete prior distribution that fol-
lows a parametric family, the assessors are more likely to
have (or be able to justify) some very limited partial prior
knowledge, e.g. two possible scenarios: (i) “I am 80% con-
fident the robot will not have any catastrophic failure in
this unsafe state” is a confidence in its catastrophic-failure-
freeness, i.e. Pr(x = 0) = 0.8. See (Littlewood and
Rushby 2012; Strigini and Povyakalo 2013) for the argu-
ments of such partial prior knowledge; (ii) “I am 90% confi-
dent the probability of seeing a catastrophic failure from this
unsafe state is smaller than 0.001” is a confidence bound
on a given probability of seeing catastrophic failure, i.e.
Pr(x ≤ 0.001) = 0.9. Such partial prior knowledge could
be supported by, e.g. when evidence is presented showing
the system is strictly developed against IEC61508 SIL34.
In the above scenarios, the elicited partial prior knowledge
is far from a complete prior distribution. Rather, if treat the
partial priors as constraints on a distribution, then there must
be an infinite set of prior distributions satisfying the prior
constraints. Note, this set of priors is different from the one
in Section 3.2 which still assumes a parametric family (i.e.
Dirichlet). Now the problem reduces to find the most conser-
vative prior distribution (in the sense of giving a maximum
posterior expected transition probability) in the infinite set
of priors satisfying the elicited prior constraints.
For example, as the first scenario, the assessor only has a
θ confidence in its catastrophic-failure-freeness:
Pr(x = 0) = θ (9)
As proved in (Strigini and Povyakalo 2013), to maximise
(8), the corresponding f(x), that subjects to the constraint
(9), is a two-point one with probability mass at Pr(x =
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safety integrity level.
0) = θ and Pr(x = q) = 1 − θ, where q is an optimisa-
tion point that can be obtained numerically. Thus, by such
two-point f(x), Equation (8) can be further bounded by:
E(x | data) ≤ (1− θ)q(1− q)
ni
θ + (1− θ)(1− z)ni <
(1− θ)q(1− q)ni
θ
≤ (1− θ)
θ(ni + 1)
(1− 1
ni + 1
)ni (10)
Note the last step above is because that q(1 − q)ni reaches
its maximum when q = 1/(ni + 1).
Depending on the particular form of partial prior knowl-
edge elicited, the worst-case priors varies, so does the pos-
teriors. For cases of other forms of partial prior knowledge,
see (Bishop et al. 2011; Zhao et al. 2015; 2017).
To summarise, in this section, we present two advanced
Bayesian estimators for the two types of transition param-
eters. Mixed use of incorrect estimators will lead to either
“too conservative to be useful results” or “continuous prior-
data conflict”, which we omit here due to the page limit.
4 The framework with an UUV example
4.1 The running example
We use an underwater search and valve turning mission in
which a UUV equipped with electrical manipulators, stereo
cameras, a specifically designed end-effector which had a
camera in-hand with force and torque sensors to (i) locate
a valve panel among different locations; and (ii) modify the
valve handles to achieve different panel configurations. Pos-
sible disturbances are, e.g. muddy water, strong currents,
blocked valves and panel occlusion. We formalise a single
valve operation as an instance of the DTMC in Fig. 1 which
has been simplified with only 6 states, whilst more realis-
tic formal models, e.g. with more states and transitions as
shown as the dotted shapes in the figure, can be obtained in
our proposed generic way as follows.
The DTMC in Fig. 1 has 3 layers. The normal operation
and safe states are modelled in the first layer, in which each
state can transit into one or more unsafe states with some
probabilities, e.g. in the S1 state of searching valve panel,
the UUV may encounter a region of muddy water leading
to the unsafe low visibility state S4. We group all the un-
safe states in the middle layer which can either transit back
to the normal operations or cause various modes of failures,
including catastrophic ones, in the bottom layer, e.g. the pro-
peller has a higher risk of malfunction when the UUV is in a
muddy water. We believe the structure of a realistic DTMC
can be built in a generic way that the top layer can be de-
rived from the original policy-making model, e.g. MDP and
reinforce learning as in (Pathak, Pulina, and Tacchella 2018;
Pathak et al. 2013), and the bottom two layers can be ob-
tained from traditional safety and reliability analysis based
on expert knowledge like Failure Mode, Mechanism and Ef-
fect Analysis (FMMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
Practically, most of the transition probabilities in the for-
mal Markov model can be argued as known constants, e.g.
by prognostics on the remaining useful life of key compo-
nents (Romain et al. 2017), leaving only a few transition
Figure 1: A layered DTMC modelling an UUV in a valve
turning mission. The dotted shapes illustrate possible exten-
sions to make the simplified example more realistic.
probabilities as unknown parameters, e.g. the x and y in Fig.
1 (thus a parametric DTMC), which will be Bayesian esti-
mated at runtime with collected data.
Fig. 1 is also an induced DTMC, since we assume the
given optimal policy is a probabilistic one for S1, e.g. with γ
probability to do speed-1 and (1−γ) probability to do speed-
2, where γ is learnt by a separate primary planner. Then the
induced transition probability from S1 to S2 is a function of
a1, a2 as given by Equation (1): a(a1, a2) = γa1+(1−γ)a2
where a1 and a2 are the probabilities of transiting from S1 to
S2 with autonomous speed-1 and speed-2 respectively. Sim-
ilarly for b(b1, b2). For S4, we assume a deterministic policy
(e.g. always do safe mode speed in low visibility), thus the
outgoing transition probabilities are single parameters.
We are interested in 4 requirements: R1: What is the
probability of completing a next mission? R2: What is the
probability of seeing catastrophic failures in a next mission?
R3: What is the probability of completing this mission? R4:
What is the probability of seeing catastrophic failures in this
mission? The R1 and R2 will be analysed at the pre-mission
stage, whose PCTL with the initial state specified as S1 are:
P=? [ true U(s = 3)] , P=? [ true U(s = 6)]
Whilst, R3 and R4 will be verified at runtime. Their PCTL
are same as above but with different specified initial states.
4.2 The framework and simulated experiments
As shown in Fig. 2, our framework has two stages:
At the pre-mission stage, a separate planner will first syn-
thesise the optimal policy, which is assumed as given in the
current framework. Given the optimal policy, an induced
DTMC is derived and then revised to emphasise the safety
and reliability by adding transitions to states representing
hazards and various modes of failures, in which some tran-
sition probabilities are unknown parameters. Then ParaMC
is conducted by tools like PRISM to generate rational func-
tions for each PCTL property. The ParaMC results will be
recorded and also reused by the on-board verifier to speed up
the verification at runtime. Monotonicity analysis for each
parameter in the rational functions is necessary due to the
use of bounds for each transition parameter. Data analysis
of experts’ knowledge, lab-simulations and previous similar
missions is performed to form prior knowledge required by
the two Bayesian estimators. Finally, by substituting param-
eters in the rational functions with the prior estimates, pre-
mission verification results are obtained, which represents
our best efforts of assurance before launching the robot.
In mission (runtime), a monitor collects new data and does
Bayesian estimates on the transition parameters. The on-
board verifier checks if any required properties are being vi-
olated at runtime based on the ParaMC results at pre-mission
stage. When any violation presents, actions like abort or in-
stantly restart the mission (with a repaired policy) can be
taken, whose implementation is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. Otherwise, the UUV will continue and keep monitoring
and verifying until the mission is complete.
Figure 2: Overview of the verification framework.
We demonstrate and evaluate our framework by simulated
experiments based on the UUV example of Fig. 1. First, to
simulate and collect data of both previous missions and the
current one for the pre-mission and runtime verifications re-
spectively, we use the PRISM simulation module by assum-
ing the true unknown transitions probabilities in Fig. 1 are:
a1 = 0.05, a2 = 0.03, b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0.1, x = 10
−5, y =
0.001, v = 0.3, w = 0.01. For the optimal policy of state
1, we assign a random number in [ 2540 ,
35
40 ]
5 for γ in each
simulated mission to mimic the practical case of changing
policies. Then, it results in 49 previous missions and a 50-th
as the current one6 which explicitly using γ = 0.75 as the
optimal probabilistic policy of state 1.
At the pre-mission stage, given the data of previous 49
missions (e.g. 1566 outgoing transitions from S1 with the
action of speed-1, in which 1180 loops in S1, 85 to S2 and
301 to S4), together with the prior knowledge in Table 1, the
posteriors by our Bayesian estimators are also listed there.
5All assumed values of the parameters in the simulation refer to
the information provided by the PANDORA project.
6Without loss of generality, we choose a 50-th mission with
relatively more transitions (522 to be exact) for a better illustration.
Next, given γ = 0.75 and using the ParaMC engine of
PRISM, we obtain closed-form results for R1 and R2 (also
R3 and R4 with different initial states for the use at runtime)
as rational functions whose monotonicity can be easily anal-
ysed with respect to the 8 transition parameters. Then we
obtain the pre-mission verification results:
R1 ∈ [0.857, 0.961] , R2 ∈ [7.96×10−4, 1.55×10−3]
In the current 50-th mission, the posteriors of the 8 tran-
sition parameters in Table 1 are in turn used as priors for the
runtime Bayesian updates. The real-time estimates at each
discrete time step of the transitions are plotted in (a)-(h) of
Fig. 3, correspondingly R3 and R4 are plotted in (i) and (j).
As shown in the (a) of Fig. 3, the CBI estimation for x de-
creases along with the execution of the robot without catas-
trophic failures. For non-catastrophic failure related param-
eters of (b)-(h), instead of using CBI to obtain a conservative
point estimation, we plot both upper and lower bounds via
Bayesian inference with sets of priors. Basically for each
of these parameters, we first observe a divergence trend of
the two bounds which then start to converge as more data is
collected. Indeed, at the beginning of a mission, due to the
sparse data collected, the prior-data conflict phenomenon is
normal and foreseeable (e.g. 3 heads out of 3 tosses of a
fair coin is conflicting our prior belief in its fairness). Such
conflict is reflected by a wider bounded (i.e. less certain)
estimation for each parameter and then propagated to the
overall verification results.
For instance, verifications on both R3 and R4 become less
and less certain in the first 100 steps, partly due to the prior-
data conflict of a1. Then, the 101-th step is a transition from
S1 to S2 with speed-1 action, which not only provides a
new estimate of a1 but also resolves the prior-data conflict
to some extent, leading to tighter bounds for a1, R3 and R4.
As more runtime data is observed, the general trend for
each pair of bounds in Fig. 3 starts to converge, meaning a
more certain verification result. Note, both R3 and R4 highly
depend on which state the UUV is currently in, so the obvi-
ous “bumps” in the plot for R3 are because the UUV is in
S2 which certainly has a relatively higher chance to com-
plete the mission. Similarly for the bumps in the plot of R4.
The above example is an ideal case in the sense that the
new learning agrees with what it learnt before, i.e. all the 50
missions are simulated based on an MDP with the same tran-
sition probabilities, like the probability of transiting back to
the normal state S1 from the low visibility state S4 is con-
stantly assumed as v = 0.3 for all 50 missions. For excep-
tional cases, e.g. there is a large body of muddy water im-
plying v = 0.8, our method will detect them as prior-data
conflict through the whole mission, thus a continuous diver-
gence of the bounds of related transition parameters will be
observed, so consequently does an overall divergence of the
verification results R3 and R4. We label this exceptional case
as “known unknowns” in the sense that the new unknown
(e.g. v = 0.8) is learnt in an informed way such that we
know how much contradict it is to our prior knowledge, thus
leading a less certain (i.e. wider bounds) new estimation.
We also would like to highlight the exceptional case of
“unknown unknowns” in which the robot fails to know
Table 1: Prior knowledge and posterior estimations for the transition parameters given the data of 49 previous missions.
x y v w a1 b1 a2 b2
pse. cou. N/A [100, 300] [100, 300] [100, 300] [100, 300] [100, 300] [50, 100] [50, 100]
pri. est. θ = 0.9 [0.001, 0.01] [0.1, 0.4] [0.001, 0.01] [0.01, 0.1] [0.1, 0.5] [0.01, 0.1] [0.1, 0.5]
post. est. 3.2e-5 [0.0014, 0.0032] [0.27, 0.33] [0.0097, 0.012] [0.047, 0.062] [0.18, 0.24] [0.03, 0.04] [0.09, 0.16]
Figure 3: Runtime Bayesian estimations for the 8 transition parameters (a)-(h) and verification results for R3 (i) and R4 (j).
which state it is in and without knowing this fact. For ex-
ample, the UUV now is in a muddy water (i.e. S4), but the
sensor fails to detect this unsafe state so that the UUV be-
lieves it is still in the normal state S1. As a consequence, the
UUV does a wrong action of either speed-1 or speed-2 (i.e.
the probabilistic policy in S1) in the unsafe state S4 instead
of the safe speed (i.e. the deterministic policy for S4). Our
method is also able to alert such dangerous case by detect-
ing prior-data conflict phenomenon that happens simultane-
ously for many parameters. Because, in the example above,
although the UUV is actually in S4, it will experience con-
stant loops in S1 without transiting to neither S4 (as the
sensors fail to detect the abnormal states) nor S2 (as wrong
actions are taken, assuming going fast in a muddy water will
never detect the valves). Consequentially, prior-data conflict
happens simultaneously for all a1, a2, b1, b2 parameters.
More examples for the exceptional cases of “known un-
knowns” and “unknown unknowns” will be discussed in fu-
ture due to the page limits here. We believe, detecting the
prior-data conflict effect during the mission can assure pro-
tection against from faulty knowledge (i.e. epistemic limits)
of the robot about its own state of health and environments.
5 Related work
How should autonomous systems be verified is a new chal-
lenging question along with their increasing applications
(Fisher, Dennis, and Webster 2013). Formal methods must
be integrated in order to develop, verify and provide certi-
fication evidence for large-scale and complex autonomous
systems like robots (Farrell, Luckcuck, and Fisher 2018).
Model checking is a widely used formal method in ver-
ifying robotic systems, due to its relative simplicity and
powerful automatic tools (Luckcuck et al. 2018). For in-
stance, in (Webster et al. 2014), a proof-of-concept ap-
proach is presented to generate certification evidence for au-
tonomous unmanned aircraft based on both model check-
ing and simulation. PMC, as a variant, emphasises the in-
herent uncertainties of the formalised system. In (Konur,
Dixon, and Fisher 2012; Gainer, Dixon, and Hustadt 2016),
the complex and uncertain behaviours of robot swarms are
analysed by PMC. In (Norman, Parker, and Zou 2017;
Pathak, Pulina, and Tacchella 2018), PMC is used to verify
the control policies of robots in partially unknown environ-
ments. In a hostile environment, the movements of adver-
saries are modelled probabilistically in (Cizelj et al. 2011).
The reliability and performance of UUVs is guaranteed by
PMC in (Gerasimou, Calinescu, and Banks 2014).
Although runtime PMC is effective for assuring the qual-
ity of service-based systems (Calinescu et al. 2011) and self-
adaptive systems (Calinescu et al. 2012; Filieri and Tam-
burrelli 2013), there is little research on runtime PMC for
robots. In the UUV domain, the first work of runtime PMC is
credited to (Gerasimou, Calinescu, and Banks 2014). How-
ever, it focuses on improving the scalability of runtime PMC
by using software engineering techniques, which is also ap-
plicable to our work here that focuses on developing new
methods of learning model parameters.
One of the initial methods to learn the transition prob-
abilities of DTMC is in (Epifani et al. 2009), which later
has been retrofitted for CTMC (Filieri, Ghezzi, and Tam-
burrelli 2012) and extended with ageing factors of collected
data to accurately estimate time-varying transition probabil-
ities (Calinescu et al. 2014). To reduce the noise and provide
smooth estimates, a lightweight adaptive filter is proposed in
(Filieri, Grunske, and Leva 2015). Whilst, above mentioned
approaches yield point estimations, these can be affected by
unquantified and potentially significant errors. The work in
(Calinescu et al. 2016) is the first to synthesise bounds for
unknown transition parameters. However, it is based on the
theory of simultaneous confidence intervals, which is funda-
mentally different to the Bayesian approach presented here
which has the distinct advantage of being able to embed var-
ious forms of prior knowledge.
6 Conclusions & future work
In this paper, we present a new framework to utilise PMC to
assess the safety and reliability of robots at both pre-mission
stage and runtime. Our main contributions are:
1. CBI is introduced with new closed-form results as a novel
estimator for catastrophic failure related parameters.
2. Imprecise probability with sets of priors is introduced as
another novel estimator for transition parameters. It al-
lows to not only quantify the estimation errors and flex-
ibly model imperfect prior knowledge, but also detect
prior-data conflict to alter various dangerous situations.
3. A generic way is discussed to structure Markov models
into layers to emphasise the system safety and reliability.
4. A real-word application of UUVs has been formalised
which can be extended and reused for future research.
For illustration purpose, we demonstrate our methods
with a stylised example which can be easily extended in our
proposed generic way without changing the main conclu-
sions, e.g. by considering the geographical waypoints in the
top layer of the DTMC or listing complete failure modes
in the bottom layer. The practicality of our new approach
needs to be further evaluated with more case studies. We
see potential issues like (i) insufficient safety analysis in
FTA/FMMEA to generate sound DTMC in the bottom two
layers; and (ii) unnecessarily complex DTMC model with
too many unknown transition parameters which require too
much prior knowledge from experts and too much data to be
collected at runtime that burdens the on-board sensors.
We plan to exploit more use of prior-data conflict and also
strong prior-data agreement (Walter and Coolen 2016) to
reflect the robot’s epistemic limitations. Requirements to be
verified for a robot should come from a higher level, e.g.
when a robot is part of the Prognostics and Health Man-
agement (PHM) system, a PHM level PMC can be done in
future to answer what to certify a robot. We also plan to pro-
pose a lightweight on-board re-planner based on an MDP
with the up-to-date bounded transition parameters.
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